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Rights of the Unsuccessful Low Bidder on
Government Contracts
INTRODUCTION

Today, public contracts are so significant that they have been characterized as "an institution playing a major part in the economic, social,
and political life of the nation . . . ."' Federal, state, and local governments have an almost uniform policy of awarding public contracts on
the basis of competitive bidding. Under this policy, the lowest monetary bid is not always the one that will be accepted. Generally, the
competitive bidding statutes insert some qualifying term which takes
the selection of a bid out of a mere tabulation of figures. The federal
public advertising statutes provide that an "award shall be made . . .
to that responsible bidder whose bid ... will be the most advantageous
to the Government, price and other factors considered."2 States and
municipalities likewise are authorized to award their public contracts to
the "lowest responsible bidder,"3 "lowest and best bidder,"4 "lowest responsible and eligible,"' or other similarly described contestants for
bids.6 Thus, the ostensible low bidder is faced with the difficulty of
meeting these other qualifications. This article will analyze the rights
of the lowest unsuccessful bidder on public contracts.
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

An initial discussion of certain factors which influence the awarding
of contracts is necessary before considering the rights of the unsuccessful low bidder. One of the threshold considerations deemed to be of
prime importance by the courts is the discretion vested in awarding authorities by the law. As noted above, most public contract statutes
provide that the award must be made to the lowest responsible or lowest
and best bidder. Interjection of the terms "responsible" or "best" is done
1. Braucher, Book Review, 3 J. PUB. L. 247, 248 (1954).
2. 63 Stat. 395 (1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1958); 70A Stat. 130 (1956),
as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1958).
3. ALA. CODE tit. 37, 468 (1958);ARK. CONsT.art. XIX, §§ 15, 16; CONN. GEN.STAT.
ANN. § 4-144 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
17, § 305 (1953); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §
84 6 7a (1957); LA.REV.STAT.ANN. § 38:2211 (Supp. 1962); N.J. STAT.ANN. § 40:50-1
(Supp. 1962); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
61, § 36 (Supp. 1962); W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 34.
4. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-112 (1949); OHIO REV. CODE § 735.05, 1523.03, 5537.04.
5. MAss. ANN.LAWS ch. 149, § 44A (Supp. 1962).
6. The variety of terms used to describe the entity or person to whom the bid shall be
awarded is evidenced by a perusal of the various Ohio competitive bidding statutes. OHIO
REV. CODE §§ 755.33, 5559.12, 6131.40 (lowest responsible); §§ 735.05, 1523.03, 5537.04
(lowest and best); § 153.08, 153.43 (lowest price); §§ 6101.16, 6115.24 (lowest or best);
5§5525.01, 5555.61 (lowest competent and responsible); §§ 153.08, 153.09, 153.43, 1523.18
(lowest bidder).
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to discourage the practice of awarding the contract on a lowest-price
basis regardless of other factors7 and to prevent judicial second-guessing
of administrative decisions.8 Because government contracts often are
used as a vehicle for carrying forward a legislature's social policy,9 a
determination must be made as to which contractor is the most capable
in effectuating these policies.
The discretionary nature of the awarding of public contracts is evident from the fact that, generally, the right to reject all bids is given
to the awarding authority. 0 One court has held the award of a contract to a non-bidder to be a reasonable exercise of discretion,1 1 while
another court has voided an award to a bidder whose bid was $118.00
higher than the lowest one."2
The term responsible means "something more than pecuniary ability;
it means also judgment, skill, ability, capacity and integrity."'" The
breadth of this definition accordingly vests a large amount of discretion
in the awarding authorities. Courts, however, still are able to wield
some control over the disposition of public contracts. This control is

used most frequently to avoid contracts of municipal officials.'4

It is

5

less effective on the state level and almost totally impotent on the
federal level.'" If it appears that no effort was made to discover
whether the rejected lowest bidder was in fact responsible, or if a higher
7. See S. REP. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1947).
8. See Walter P. Villere Co. v. Blum, 156 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1946); O'Brien v. Carney,
6 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass. 1934). But see Housing Authority v. Pittman Constr. Co., 264
F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959). Cf. Speidel, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Government Contracts, 38 N.Y.U.L REv. 621 (1963).
9. See Miller, Government Contracts and Socia Control: A PreliminaryInquiry, 41 VA. L
REV. 27 (1955); Paisley, The NondiscriminationClause in Government Contracts, 43 VA. L.
REV. 837 (1957).
10. See 63 Stat. 395 (1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1958), wherein the federal government reserves the right to reject all bids "when the agency head determines that
it is in the public interest to do so." See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 305 (1953);
Annot., 31 A.LR.2d 469 (1953); cf. Sheet Metal Employers' Ass'n v. Giordano, 188 N.E.2d
329 (Ohio C.P. 1963) (implied authority).
11. Peeples v. Byrd, 98 Ga. 688, 25 S.Y. 677 (1898); cf. S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Oklahoma City, 191 Okla. 276, 129 P.2d 185 (1942).
12. Housing Authority v. Pittman Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959).
13. O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761, 762 (D. Mass. 1934).
14. Adolphus v. Baskin, 95 Fla. 603, 116 So. 225 (1916) (contract voided as an unreasonable exercise of discretionary power); Seysler v. Mowery, 29 Idaho 412, 160 Pac. 262 (1916)
(voided where facts did not appear in the record to support other award); Armitage v.
Mayor & Council, 86 N.J.L. 5, 99 Ad. 1035 (Sup. Ct. 1914) (voided where contract terms
changed without advertisement); Kratz v. City of Allentown, 304 Pa. 51, 155 AtL 116 (1931)
(voided where adequate investigation of the low bid not made).
15. Ellison v. Oliver, 147 Ark. 252, 227 S.W. 586 (1921) (contract voided for gross irregularity in procedure); Mulmix v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 23 Colo. 71, 46 Pac. 123 (1896).
16. Cf. McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (lease voided for failu:e
to follow statute). But see O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass. 1934).
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bid was accepted without giving the lowest bidder an opportunity to
offer proof of his responsibility, the contracts have been abrogated. 7
Where the awarding authority is given this discretion, it is incumbent upon it to determine the lowest and best bid. Thus, on the state
level, in Dictophone Corp. v. O'Leary,'" the court ordered the state commissioner to determine which of the two exact bids was the lowest responsible one. Correspondingly, the federal government is required to
make an award to the lowest responsible bidder and, in the absence of
a determination as to lack of responsibility, no authority exists to support an award to a higher bidder.' 9
There are several criteria for determining the lowest and best bid.
A prime factor is the contractor's experience in the field. While experience in similar work can be a sufficient reason for awarding a contract to one not the lowest bidder, ° the lowest bidder ordinarily will
not be rejected because he lacks the skill and experience of his competitors.2' The search for experience and skill must be balanced against
the desirability of obtaining the needed work or supplies at the lowest
possible price.22 A contractor's prior performance of government contracts can be considered in determining the lowest responsible bidder, 3
but his prior poor performance based solely on his lack of capacity or
credit is not sufficient to reject a bid.24
A second important factor is the bidder's integrity. A low monetary
bid may be rejected on the basis that the bidder does not possess the
requisite integrity to faithfully perform the contract. Thus, a contractor's
prior record of bribing officials has resulted in a rejection of his bid."
Also, a previous conviction of a bidder for a crime committed in per17. Housing Authority v. Pittman Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959); American
Water Corp. v. Mayor & Council, 5 N.J. Misc. 969, 139 Ad. 169 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Kelley'
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 90 N.J.L. 411, 101 At. 422 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
18. 287 N.Y. 491, 41 N.E.2d 68 (1942).
19. 37 DECS. CoMP. GEN. 51 (1957), aff'd on reconsideration,37 DECS. COMP. GEN. 550
(1958).
20. In re Kaelber, 281 App. Div. 980, 120 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1953).
21. See 20 DECS. COMP. GEN. 862 (1941).
22. See 14 DECs. COMP. GEN. 305 (1934); 8 DEcs. CoMP. GEN. 252 (1928); 7 DECS.
COMP. GEN. 181 (1927).

23. Albro Contracting Corp. v. Department of Pub. Works, 13 Misc. 2d 846, 181 N.Y.S.2d
402 (Sup Ct. 1958).
24. 38 DECS. CoMP. GEN. 289 (1958); Cf. 25 DECS. COMP. GEN. 859 (1946).
See
IA GOv'T CONT. REP. 5 52-103 (1954). See also Housing Authority v. Pittman Constr.
Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959), where it was held unreasonable to require bidder to
supply affidavits from 90% of his subcontractors on previous jobs.
25. Arthur Venneri Co. v. Patterson Housing Authority, 29 N.J. 392, 149 A.2d 228
(1959); Kayfield Constr. Co. v. Morris, 15 App. Div. 2d 373, 225 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1962);
cf. Caristo Constr. Corp. v. Rubin, 30 Misc. 2d 185, 221 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct.), modified,
15 App. Div. 2d 561, 222 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1961), a!f'd, 10 N.Y.2d 538, 180 N.E.2d 794,.
225 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1962).
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forming 26a government contract has supported a finding of lack of
integrity.

A third factor to be considered is the contractor's financial ability.
Although some courts will look solely at this factor, 7 lack of financial
ability can be easily cured by requiring a performance bond28 or government financing. 9
A fourth factor is labor relations. Obviously they may affect the
ability of a contractor to conform with delivery or performance requirements. It has been held that the employment of'non-union labor is not
a sufficient reason for rejecting a low bid. 30 However, where labor
disputes are imminent, the awarding officer will have to weigh the risks
of nonperformance of the contract against the possible advantages of
awarding it to a contractor who submitted the lowest bid, but is likely
to be confronted with strikes because of his labor disputes.
A determination of responsibility may be dependent on the type
and kind of work to be performed.31 Moreover, in some instances, this
determination must be made in contemplation of effectuating certain
policies of the legislatures. For example, ability to comply with the
federal nondiscrimination clause has been listed as one factor to be considered in determining responsibility. 2 Other statutes authorize that
greater consideration be given to domestic products or labor,3 small
business,"' or areas of chronic unemployment.3 5
Thus, use of the term "responsible" has raised administrative deter26. 39 DEcs. Comp. GEN. 468 (1959).
27. Ross v. Board of Educ., 42 Ohio St. 374 (1884); Norris v. Board of Educ., 12 Ohio I.
Abs. 639 (Ct. App. 1932).
28. Cf. 13 Dncs. CoMP. GEN. 274 (1934); 6 DEcs. Com:P. GEN. 557 (1927).
29. See Small Business Act, 67 Star. 233 (1953), 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-33 (1958); Cary,
Government Financing of Essential Contractors: The Reorganization of The Glenn L. Martin

Company, 66 HARV. L.REV. 834 (1953).

30. Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 165 P. Supp. 275 (D. Del. 1958); State
ex rel. United Dist. Heating Co. v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 124 Ohio St. 413, 179 N.E.
138 (1931); 31 DECS. CoMP. GEN. 561 (1952); cf. 17 DEcs. COMP. GEN. 37 (1937).
Compare Pallos v. Johnson, 100 Colo. 449, 68 P.2d 559 (1937), wherein the low bid was
rejected because of non-union labor in area of high unemployment and strong labor unions.
See Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1403 (1937).
31. See Bright v. Ball, 138 Miss. 508, 103 So. 236 (1925), holding that a physically handicapped bus driver was not a responsible bidder for the transportation of school children to
and from school. See also People ex rel. Haecker Sterling Co. v. City of Buffalo, 176 N.Y.
Supp. 642 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (ability to furnish necessary repair parts may be considered when
purchasing autos); Hutto v. State Bd. of Educ., 165 S.C. 37, 162 S.E. 751 (1932).
32. 32 C.F.R. § 1.903-.907 (1962); Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
33. Buy American Act, 47 Stat. 1530 (1933), 41 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1958); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 8961 (1942). See Lubiol Heat & Power Corp., v. Pleydell, 178 Misc. 562, 34
N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
34. 70A Stat. 127, 10 U.S.C. § 2301 (1958) ("It is the policy of Congress that a fair
proportion of the purchases and contracts be placed with small business concerns.")
35. See Defense Manpower Policy No. 4, 17 Fed. Reg. 1195-96 (1952).
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mination of the "lowest bidder" above the status of a mere perfunctory
process of following directions. It has become a duty involving an
irreducible minimum of discretion. 6 With all of the foregoing factors
to be considered, there is a considerably wide range of discretion available
to the awarding officers. It is not considered the court's function to be
the omniscient overseer as to the awarding of all these contracts. Second-guessing administrative officials leads to a lack of confidence in
them and a consequent lowering of morale. It is only where this discretion is abused that the courts should intervene.
STANDING TO SUE

The disappointed low bidder is met at the outset with the problem
of lack of standing to contest the award of a contract to another. He
cannot sue to have the contract awarded to him, enjoin the award to
another, or have all bids rejected. The most commonly accepted rationale for this situation is that the competitive bidding statutes were
enacted for the benefit of the public, and noncompliance yields no right
to the lowest bidder. He can contest only through a taxpayer's action."7
It is reasoned that the disappointed contractor merely is seeking enforcement of a personal right, whereas the taxpayer is seeking to enforce a
right held in common with other taxpayers for their benefit."8
The lack of standing is posited on the theory that contracting with
the government is a privilege rather than a right.3 9 Therefore, the
plaintiff cannot allege that his legal injury is greater than the injury
he experiences "in common with people generally."4
The standing
requirement assures that the controversy will be decided only if it is
properly presented in an adverse manner.4 Consequently, in the absence of a personal interest, any adjudication would produce only judg36. See United States Wood Preserving Co. v. Sundmaker, 186 Fed. 678 (6th Cir. 1911);
Rosenbaum, Criteria for Awarding Public Contracts to the Lowest Responsible Bidder, 28
CORNELL L.Q. 37 (1942).
37. Peeples v. Byrd, 98 Ga. 688, 25 S.E. 677 (1898); Talbot Paving Co. v. City of Detroit, 109 Mich. 657, 67 N.W. 979 (1896); Day v. City of Beatrice, 169 Neb. 858, 101
N.W.2d 481 (1960).
Cf. GA.CODE ANN. § 64-101 (1935); NEB. REV. STAT. § 73:103
(1943).
38. Compare State ex rel. Skilton v. Miller, 164 Ohio St. 163, 128 N.E.2d 47 (1955);
State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie, 45 Wash. 2d 82, 273 P.2d 464 (1954).
39. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
40. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937), where the court states that the injury must result from a wrong
"which directly results in a violation of a legal right."
41. "These assumptions are reconciled with practical efficiency by the notion that courts
are more apt to formulate or apply rules if the opposite sides are prevented from sitting
around a table together in friendly conference ....
Bitter partizanship in opposite directions
is supposed to bring out the truth." Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV.
L REV. 913, 922 (1934).
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ment in the abstract as to the legality of the action.' The disappointed
bidder may have irremediable damages; but his lack of standing precludes his suit because he cannot meet the legal right requirement. The
rule requiring standing is so well established that there is a relative
paucity of suits in the area of government contracts where standing based
solely on competitive injury was used to meet the legal injury require43
ment.
The leading case holding that the competitive bidder has no standing to sue is Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.44 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the Secretary of Labor from determining minimum wages provisions for
certain industries. They asserted that such a determination would violate
their right to bid and negotiate government contracts free from such an
interference. The court held that the government, like a private individual, has an unfettered power "to determine those with whom it
will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make
needed purchases."45 Just as the contract terms imposed by a private
party are for his own benefit, the provisions of the competitive bidding
statutes are for the government's benefit and confer no right upon private contractors. Absence of this right defeats the disappointed bidde's
claim of standing to sue despite possible damage and loss of income.'
With the Perkins case as binding precedent, subsequent decisions have
denied unsuccessful bidders on government contracts any right to conState courts have reached similar results.48
test the award."
This result has been rationalized on the basis that it would be im42. See Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cit. 1943).
43. Compare Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955), where unsuccessful low bidder
for airport concession had no standing to assert CAB's non-compliance with statutory bid procedure, with McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955), where an unsuccessful
bidder was permitted to assert non-compliance with applicable regulations in awarding a
mineral lease without a discussion of standing, and Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co.,
338 U.S. 621 (1950), where appellant challenged federal action favorable to a competitor
on basis of violation of regulation and based standing on violation of contract right that was
incorporated onto his lease. See American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 112
F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953); Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411
(1954).
44.

310 U.S. 113 (1940).

45. Id. at 127.
46. Id. at 125.
47. United States v. Gray Line Water Tours, 311 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1962); Wooldridge vtfg. Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cit. 1962), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 989 (1956); Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Fulton Iron Co. v. Larson,
171 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 903 (1949); Robert Hawthorne,
Inc. v. Department of Interior, 160 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Royal Sundries Corp. v.
United States, 112 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); Clement Martin, Inc. v. Dick Corp., 97
F. Supp. 961 (ED. Pa. 1951). But see McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
48. E.g., Peeples v. Byrd, 98 Ga. 688, 25 S.E. 677 (1896); Talbot Paving Co. v. City of
Detroit, 109 Mich. 657, 67 N.W. 979 (1896); Day v. City of Beatrice, 169 Neb. 858, 101
N.W.2d 481 (1960).
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practical to require an administrator to defend every act of discretion in
a court room. Such a. view appears to be justified in view of the great
number of contractors with which the government deals. The disappointed ones, armed with such a weapon, obviously could make administrative efficiency almost nonexistent. 9 The Federal Administration
Procedure Act,"° while giving judicial review to any person adversely
affected or aggrieved, "undoubtedly adds nothing to the law"51 in this
area.
In contrast, the argument that a disappointed contractor should have
standing to contest the award of a contract also presents cogent and impelling reasons. Competitive bidding statutes are designed to prevent
favoritism and exorbitant prices. Without such a public letting, a
contractor could be awarded a contract without competition. This would
utterly flout the primary purpose of competitive bidding: to obtain the
needed work and materials at prices which are most advantageous to
the government.5"
The disappointed bidder has been allowed suit under alternate reasoning: as a taxpayer - this sometimes requires a demonstration of injury to
the public - or as a private party showing injury different from that
suffered by the public. Under the first theory, many courts state that
the taxpayer is the proper party to challenge a contract award; hence
the contractor cannot challenge such action unless he is also a taxpayer.5"
The courts often treat the motive of the taxpayer as irrelevant.5 4 As a
practical matter, he thus is likely to sue only if he can reap some pecuniary award such as recovering a percentage of the funds that his
action has saved the public treasury. 5 Although the taxpayer's suit is
49. See L. P. Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 110, 131 (1940); cf. Schlesinger v. Gates, 249 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 939 (1958).

50. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1958).
51. Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 670, 690 (1947). See Clement Martin, Inc. v. Dick Corp.,
97 F. Supp. 961, 964 (W.D. Pa. 1951), "The Administrative Procedure Act did not create
rights but confers jurisdiction to review discretionary acts of agencies which affected existing
statutory rights. This plaintiff as a competitive bidder has not shown that he has any [such]
rights .. " But see 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. § 43a(c) (1958); George v. Mitchell,
282 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Mitchell v. Covington Mills, Inc. 229 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1002 (1956).
52. See Boxwell v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 759, 14 So. 2d 627 (1943).
53. See, e.g., Talbot Paving Co. v. City of Detroit, 109 Mich. 657, 67 N.W. 979 (1896);
State ex rel. Helena Allied Printing Council v. Mitchell, 105 Mont. 326, 74 P.2d 417 (1937);
Times Publishing Co. v. City of Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 37 Pac. 695 (1894).
54. Mock v. City of Santa Rosa, 126 Cal. 330, 58 Pac. 826 (1899); Turkovich v. Board of
Trustees, 11 111. 2d 460, 143 N.E.2d 229 (1957); Stewart v. Stanley, 199 La. 146, 5 So. 2d
531 (1941).
55. OKLA. STAT. ANN.tit.
62, § 373 (1963). Other states allow the successful taxpayer
to recover his costs. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 5511-642, 35-213 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 84-1613 (1960); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 162, 5514, 16 (1957); N.Y. MUNIC. LAw § 51;
OHIO REV. CODE §§ 309.12-.13. Some states allow recovery of attorney fees. ARIZ. REV.
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sometimes limited by a necessity of showing a pecuniary loss to the public
treasury,5" often nothing more than a showing of an infinitesimal loss is
required. 7 Arbitrary action on the part of the awarding authority has
its greatest affect on the contractor's pocketbook. Consequently, the unsuccessful low bidder can show a greater loss to himself than to the public.
In these circumstances, a suit by a disappointed contractor accomplishes the same purposes as does the public action. It is more important to consider the nature of the alleged abuse than the party seeking to rectify it. It is the public who will be the ultimate beneficiaries
of the suit."8 This argument has been more persuasive on the local level,
as the taxpayer can challenge municipal action in most states.59 He has
not been able to challenge state action as readily" and is virtually powerless against federal action.61 Furthermore, the taxpayer suit is only a
means of rectifying illegal practices of the government, whose action
would otherwise go unchecked. Suit by the disappointed contractor
accomplishes the same result in this area.
The equities in favor of allowing the disappointed contractor to
contest unfavorable government action are quite convincing. Copper
Plumbing & Heating Co. v.Campbell" reflects part of this new trend.
Plaintiff contested the validity of an order which placed its name on
the government's debarment list. This made "itineligible to receive
government contracts for a period of three years. The court of appeals
STAT. ANN. 5§ 11-642, 35-213 (1956); OHIO REV. CODE § 309.13; S.D. CODE § 33.1803-1
(Supp. 1960).
56. E.g., Bassett v. Desmond, 140 Conn. 426, 101 A.2d 294 (1953); Fristad v. Sherman, 76
N.W.2d 903 (N.D.1956); McCarthy v. McAloon, 79 R-I. 55, 83 A.2d 75 (1951).
57. See Ellingham v.Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 414, 99 N.E. 1,29 (1912) where the court held:
'"he small proportionate sum of the cost of the election would fallupon appellee as a taxpayer is not of itself sufficient to destroy his competency to sue." See also Bairn v. Fleck,
406 II. 193, 92 NE.2d 770 (1950).
58. An example of how the public can lose considerable sums of money through a lack of
means for contesting a letting of a contract isthe recent award by the federal government for
fighter planes. Itwas estimated that the award cost the government from $91 million to
$415 million more than if it had been given to a competitor and that the competitor's designs
were superior in nine out of ten aspects. See Wall Street J., March 4, 1963, p. 11, col. 2.
59. E.g., Nuckols v. Lyle, 8 Idaho 589, 70 Pac. 401 (1902); Pierce v. Hagans, 79 Ohio St.
9, 86 N.E. 519 (1908); Barnett v. Lincoln, 162 Wash. 613, 299 Pac. 392 (1931); c. Ronnow v.City of Las Vegas, 57 Nev.332, 65 P.2d 133 (1937).
60. E.g., Turnipseed v. Blan, 226 Ala. 549, 148 So. 116 (1933); Spahr v.Brown, 19 Ohio
App.107 (1925); Bourne v. Cole, 53 Wyo.31, 77 P.2d 617 (1938). Contra, Asplund v.
Hannett, 31 N.M. 641, 249 Pac. 1074 (1926); Bull v. Stichman, 273 App.Div. 311, 78
N.Y.S.279, aff'd, 298 N.Y.516, 80 N.E.2d 661 (1948).
61. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Taft Hotel Corp. v. Housing & Home
Fin. Agency, 162 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn.), aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1958),
cart. denied, 359 U.S. 967 (1959); Gart v. Cole, 166 F. Supp. 129, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
cf. United States v.Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Franklin Township v. Tugwell, 85 F.2d 208
(D.C. Cir. 1936). See Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MfNN. L.
REV. 353, 386-91 (1955); Note, 24 GEO. .J.974 (1936); Note, 37 HARV. L RE . 750
(1924); Comment, 2 U.CL.A.L. REV. 129 (1954).
62. 290 F.2d 368 (D.C.Cir. 1961).
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held that while the plaintiff probably had no right to contest an award
of a government contract it definitely had a right "not to be invalidly
denied equal opportunity... to seek contracts on government projects."'
Arbitrarily debarring a potential contractor is essentially no different
from capriciously failing to award him a contract. In both situations
he is denied that which in the normal course of events might have been
his.
The potential harm that can result when a low bidder is arbitrarily
denied an award is incalculable.64 Inability to effectively lodge a protest
certainly will tend to discourage a prospective bidder from expending
considerable sums of money in preparation of his bid. His anticipation
that he will not be accorded fair and equal treatment will dramatically
emphasize the futility of spending time and energy to complete and
submit a bid proposal. A further problem will arise where a contractor's
only key to a credit standing is a government contract. Those dealing
with him will have confidence that they will be paid for their work and
be able to satisfy their creditors only when he is successful. An arbitrary denial of a contract in this situation may very easily sound the
death knell for a budding concern, as well as wreak havoc on established
ones.
Recognition of a minimal interest in the award would appear to be a
workable solution. At least Louisiana and New Jersey have recognized
that the lowest responsible bidder has a justifiable interest in the award
and may sue upon it. It is reasoned that the bidder is entitled at least
to proof of his own unfitness.6"
The application of the Perkins doctrine to deny standing to the
frustrated low bidder often can result in gross inequities. " When im63. Id. at 370. Under the Walsh-Healy Act, a debarred contractor is now given standing
as an "interested person" to contest a debarment order. 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C.
§ 43a(c) (1958). This provision has been limited in its application solely to Walsh-Healy
controversies. See George v. Mitchell, 282 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cit. 1960); Mitchell v. Covington
Mills, Inc. 229 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1002 (1956).
64. An "applicant for . . . a government contract, whose financial well-being may be
wholly dependent on the government grant... [should not be treated any differently from) one
declared to be injured in his personal or property 'rights.'" ScHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON LAW 159 (1939).
Cf. ATfY GEN. cOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, DIVISION OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS 4 (1939). ("Penalty of blacklisting is so severe that its imposition may destroy a going business ....")
65. Housing Authority v. Pittman Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959); St. Landry
Lumber Co. v. Town of Bunkie, 155 La. 892, 99 So. 687 (1924); Fourmy v. Town of Franklin, 126 La. 151, 52 So. 249 (1910); American Water Corp. v. Borough of Florham Park, 5
N.J. Misc. 969, 139 Atd. 169 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Maginnis v. City of Wildwood, 94 N.J.L. 90,
108 Ad. 780 (Sup. Ct.) rev'd on appeal, 94 N.J.L. 425, 110 Ad. 820 (Ct. Err. & App.
1920).
66. Cf. Nathanson, Central Issues of American Administrative Law, 45 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
348, 373 (1951). "When the Government's purchases are so great that they dominate the
entire economy, the implications of the Perkins decision with respect to unreviewable administrative power can hardly be overstated."
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properly denied a contract, a bidder's major recourse will be to try to
stop the award by working through political channels. Clearly, such
a practice is unhealthy. Rather, a recognition of a cause of action by the
low bidder would permit those most closely involved in the transaction
to aid in effectuating the policy of the statute." Due weight must be
given to the fact that contractors must be protected from unauthorized
and arbitrary government action.
Moreover, the quest for administrative efficiency should not adumbrate the low bidder's status. There appears to be no valid reason to
award judicial review to one whose personal or property rights are being
infringed and to deny the same relief to one whose economic livelihood
is concentrated and dependent upon government contracts.6" The overriding consideration of the standing doctrine in the administrative area
is the attempt to create a workable environment for the administration
of legislative policy. 9 But this should not be the all-controlling factor.
While lack of standing can be justified where the petitioner is adequately represented by others,"0 where there is danger of multitudinous
appeals,7' or where the public interest requires quick administrative
action,72 there appears to be no valid reason to deny the low bidder
standing. As discussed below, it would be better to base the low bidder's
standing to sue on wrongful interference with his business reldtions"
rather than on the actual damage in fact.
TORTIous ECONOMIC INJURY

One may be liable in tort for malicious interference with a right to
secure a contract or interference with a prospective economic advantage.
Such liability is based on the theory that a duty exists to avoid intentionally interfering with another's reasonable business expectations."m
67.

If the unsuccessful bidder is denied standing, "there is no one impelled by duty or

self-interest to prevent the violation of an important provision . . . designed to protect the
public ....
Molloy v. City of New Rochelle, 198 N.Y. 402, 412, 92 N.E. 94, 98 (1919) (dissenting opinion). Oklahoma specifically authorizes an unsuccessful bidder to sue for an injunction if an award violates the competitive bidding statutes. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61,
40 (1953).
68. See Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law, 51 MiCH. L. REV. 775, 843 (1953).
69. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
70. See Schenley Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432 (1945). But see American Power
& Light Co. v. Securities Exch. Comm'n, 325 U.S. 385, 390 (1945).
71. United States Sugar Refiners Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943).
72. Algoma Coal Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1935).
73. Compare American Can Co. v. Milk Control Bd., 313 Mass. 156, 46 N.E.2d 542 (1943)
with Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949).
Cf. Jaffe, Standing to Secure JudicialReview: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 304-05

(1961).
74. R.ESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766 comment b (1938); see Sustick v. Slatina, 48 N.J. Super.
134, 137 A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1957); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759.
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Recovery for breach of this duty generally will be the anticipated profits."3
In some instances, punitive damages have been allowed.76 The plaintiff
must prove first that the defendant acted intentionally; second, that such
acts were in absence of legal excuse or justification;77 and third, that
without the defendant's interference,78 a reasonable degree of certainty
existed that the plaintiff would have entered into the contract.79 This
conventional tort concept has been introduced into the public contract
field by way of two recent decisions8" which have given the disappointed
low bidder additional remedies.
In Highway Paving Co. v. Hausman8 the plaintiff, who was low
bidder, alleged that the awarding officials conspired to award the contract to another contractor, thereby maliciously interfering with his
right to secure the contract. The court held such conduct to be an
actionable wrong. Although the low bidder statutes would confer no
right on the plaintiff to be awarded the contract or to enjoin its award
to another, the defendant's conspiratorial activities gave rise to liability
in tort. Furthermore, the defense of executive immunity for public officials does not extend to acts done "maliciously and with intent to injure." 2 Consequently, the public officials and the successful contractor
in this case would have to respond in damages.
Such a proposition is a relatively new concept. Several suits had been
brought in tort by unsuccessful low bidders seeking lost anticipated profits
for a malicious interference with the right to contract.8 3 Yet only one
53 Atd. 230 (Ch. 1902); Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952); Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 228
(1950).
75. E.g., Lewis v. Bloede, 202 Fed. 7 (4th Cir. 1912); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 510-26
(1956).
76. See Sparks v. McCrary, 156 Ala. 382, 47 So. 332 (1908).
77. See Lewis v. Bloede, 202 Fed. 7 (4th Cit. 1912); St. John v. Building Trades Council,
76 Nev. 290, 352 P.2d 820 (1960); Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Rice, 4 N.J. 169, 72 A.2d 197
(1950).
78. Campbell v. Rayburn, 129 Cal. App. 2d 232, 276 P.2d 671 (1954).
79. Goldman v. Feinberg, 130 Conn. 671, 37 A.2d 355 (1944); McCue v. Deppert, 21 N.J.
Super. 591, 91 A.2d 503 (App. Div. 1952); Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 263
N.Y. 386, 189 N.E. 463 (1934); Williams & Co. v. Collins, Tuttle & Co., 6 App. Div. 2d 302,
176 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1958).
80. Highway Paving Co. v. Hausman, 171 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Heyer Prods. Co.
v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 63, 140 F. Supp. 409 (1956), modified, 177 F. Supp. 251 (Ct.
Cl. 1959).
81. 171 F. Supp. 768, 769 (E.D.Pa. 1959).
82. Id. at 770. Cf. Somers Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., 198 F. Supp. 732 (D.N.J. 1961).
In Pedersen v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 95 (D. Guam 1961), the government advertised
for bids on obsolete ammunition. Plaintiff was the high bidder. He alleged that his bid
was rejected because of derogatory statements circulated by defendant, the accepted bidder.
Such conduct was held to be actionable.
83. Lewis v. Bloede, 202 Fed. 7 (4th Cir. 1912). See also Zoby v. American Fid. Co.,
143 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Va. 1956), af!'d, 242 F.2d 76 (4th Cit. 1957); Gales-Rojac Corp. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 2 Misc. 2d 613, 151 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Neel v. Allegheny
County Mem. Park, 391 Pa. 354, 137 A.2d 785 (1958); cf. East River Gas-Light Co. v.
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action had been successful prior to Highway Paving.8 In denying relief, it was reasoned that the failure to make an award to the lowest
.responsible bidder, whether in good faith or otherwise, ordinarily did
not subject the awarding authorities to liability for damages to such a
bidder."5
The holding in Highway Paving appears to be justifiable in view of
the fact that it affords a low bidder some relief in an area where he
-would otherwise be remediless. His position is buttressed by the fact
that low bidder statutes limit an otherwise unfettered discretion in
-awarding public contracts. Thus a reasonable degree of certainty is
afforded in the award of the contract."6 Those who would deny recovery
would do so on the basis that since the plaintiff did not have an absolute
xight to the award, he lost nothing by defendant's tortious conduct.8"
Seemingly, a danger in this type of suit is that a determination of the
low bidder necessarily involves at least a minimal amount of discretion.
Public officials should be free to exercise that discretion without having
to justify their decisions in court.8 8 However, the allowance of this
type of suit does contemplate the reasonable exercise of discretion. It
affords a remedy only to the contractor who was maliciously deprived of
:a contract which in all probability would have been his but for the defendant's tortious interference.
A further criticism, which also does not withstand analysis, is that
-allowance of this type of suit will only increase the amount of the contractor's damages and the corresponding loss of public funds unless the
-contractor's interest coincides with that of the public.8 " But this type
Donnelly, 93 N.Y. 557 (1883) (action for damages). But cf. Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96
(D.C. Cir. 1955) where there was no recovery despite the fact that contracting officer told a
competitor the amount of plaintiff's bid. See also Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng.
-Corp., 145 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1955), affd., 2 App. Div. 2d 27, 152 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1956).
84. Lewis v. Bloede, 202 Fed. 7 (4th Cit. 1912); accord, Somers Constr. Co. v. Board of
Educ., 198 F. Supp. 732 (D.N.J. 1961). See Southwestern Publishing Co. v. Ney, 227 Ark.
-52, 302 S.W.2d 538 (1957); Moore v. Bonbright & Co., 202 App. Div. 281, 195 N.Y.
Supp. 854 (1922). But see Malan Constr. Corp. v. Board of County Rd. Comm'rs, 187 F.
Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich. 1960) (alternative prayer for damages denied).
85. Molloy v. City of New Rochelle, 198 N.Y. 402, 92 N.E. 94 (1910); American Artificial
Stone Pavement Co. v. Wagner, 139 Pa. 623, 21 Ad. 160 (1891). Cf. Pfaff Constr. Co. v. Leonard, 40 Ohio App. 246, 178 N.E. 328 (1931), where the court held that one entitled to contract cannot recover damages where enjoined from performing because of a taxpayer's suit.
S6. Compare Smith v. Christopherson, 267 Wis. 150, 64 N.W.2d 744 (1954), where
the failure to allege that the plaintiff could qualify for a federal commitment to secure a
mortgage precluded recovery for malicious interference with economic advantage.
87. Rees v. Board of Educ., 6 Utah 2d 196, 310 P.2d 387 (1957); see Zimmerman v. Board
of Educ., 38 N.J. 65, 183 A.2d 25 (1962).
88. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1944).
89. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (dictum), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950).

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:208

of lawsuit is a means of deterring public officials from representing any
other than the public interest.
Although a tort action presents a viable alternative to the bidder on
government contracts, it is not without its practical shortcomings. A
plaintiff can recover only for malicious interference and not for a negligent exercise of discretion in failing to award a contract." The difficulty
of producing the requisite quantum of evidence to support the allegations
of malice is evident. Because of the clandestine nature of any conspiracy, a plaintiff may be able only to prove negligence at most and
thus fail to recover at all.
A second difficulty is that the awarding officials generally are
shielded from tort liability. Public officials usually are not liable
for unintentional torts committed in the exercise of their discretionary
functions.9 1 Personal liability, however, may attach to government officials for actions beyond their statutory authority.12 Both federal and
state officials probably are immune from liability for intentional torts,93
although the federal government may be liable under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.94 At most, a disappointed low bidder may have to be satisfied with a suit against non-governmental third parties who have deprived him of an economic opportunity."a
A second remedy available to the disappointed low bidder is evidenced in Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States?96 Plaintiff contended that
the contract was not awarded to him out of retaliation for his testifying
at a Senate hearing. The Court of Claims held that these allegations
90. Somers Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., 198 F. Supp. 732 (D.N.J. 1961); cf . Wooldridge
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956),
where relief was denied for failure to supply pertinent information to enable plaintiff to make
an intelligent bid.
91. See Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,
59 HARv. L. REV. 1060 (1946); Davis, Administrative Officers, Tort Liability, 55 MIcH.
L. REV. 201 (1956); Note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 488 (1953).
92. See GELLHORN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 352-55 (4th ed. 1960). See also
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
See generally Note, 55 COLtJM. L. REV. 73
(1955); Comment, 8 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1956); Comment, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 382 (1955).
93. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 490 (1896), complainant alleged malice on the
part of the Postmaster General, but the Court held the motive that impelled him to do that
of which the plaintiff complains . . . is immaterial. Wilson v. Hirst, 67 Ariz. 197, 193 P.2d
461 (1948); Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952). Contra, Highway
Paving Co. v. Hausman, 171 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1959) where state officials were held
liable for acts done maliciously and with intent to injure. See also Miller v. Horton, 152
Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891); Smith v. Christopherson, 267 Wis. 150, 64 N.W.2d 744
(1954) (dictum).
94. 60 Star. 845 (1945), codified in various parts of 28 U.S.C. (1958).
See Builders
Corp. of America v. United States, 259 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1958).
95. See Lewis v. Bloede, 202 Fed. 7 (4th Cit. 1912) (competitor); Somers Constr. Co. v.
Board of Educ., 198 F. Supp. 732 (D.N.J. 1961) (architects); Pedersen v. United States,
191 F. Supp. 95 (D. Guam 1961) (other bidder). See also Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d
104 (9th Cir. 1962).
96. 135 Ct. Cl. 63, 140 F. Supp. 409 (1956).
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stated an actionable claim, but recovery would be limited to expenses incurred in preparation of the bid. 7 By advertising for bids, the government had implicitly promised that each bid "would be honestly
considered, and that the offer which, in the honest opinion of the conwas most advantageous to the Government would be
tracting officer,
98
accepted."
Previous cases held that all bids for government contracts were to
be given fair consideration and not rejected arbitrarily.9 It also had
been intimated before Heyer that persons could be liable for interference with a prospective contractor's right to impartial treatment before
The decision in Heyer appears justifiable in
a government agency.'
view of the fact that it is a policy of Congress to encourage bidding 1.
"to secure for the Government the benefits which arise from competition."' 2 Indeed, without a promise of impartial treatment in bidding
procedures, many would hesitate to expend large sums of money to
prepare their bids.
The court's treatment of two issues in the Heyer case appears to be
questionable. First, considering the complaint as a contract action instead of tort is contrary to previous decisions. It has been held that a
disappointed low bidder has no cause of action for breach of an implied
contract to make an award in conformity with the competitive bidding
statutes. 3 A claim for the traditional tort of deceit would more nearly
approximate the action taken in Heyer, for the plaintiff had parted with
money or property of value in reliance on false representations as to
fair consideration implied in the advertisements for bids." 4 However,
the federal government is precluded from liability for its agents' mis97. But see Roseked v. Board of Comm'rs, 88 Ind. 267 (1882), where the court held that
an unsuccessful bidder for a contract to be awarded by competitive bidding cannot recover
the costs of preparing for the bid.
98. Hayer Prods. Co. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl.63, 140 F. Supp. 409, 412 (1956).
99. United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., 249 U.S. 313, 318 (1919) ([Competitive bidding]
is a provision ... necessarily giving rights to both and placing obligations on both."); Cooper
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368, 370-71 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (a prospective contractor has a right "not to be invalidly denied equal opportunity... to seek contracts on government projects."); United States v. Brookridge Farm, Inc., 111 F.2d 461, 463
(10th Cir. 1940) ('The purpose of these statutes and regulations is to give all persons equal
right to compete for government contracts."); Royal Sundries Corp. v. United States, 112 F.
Supp. 244, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) ("tT~here is implicit in the invitation to bid ...an undertaking of good faith on the part of the agency of acquisition ...."); Refining Associates v.
United States, 109 F. Supp. 259, 262 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (bidder on government contract has
right to have bid considered on merits).
100. Clement Martin, Inc. v. Dick Corp., 97 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
101. See S. REP. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1947).
102. United States v. Brookridge Farms Inc., 111 F.2d 461, 463 (10th Cir. 1940).
103. Martin v. United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 430 (1926). See Royal Sundries Corp. v. United
States, 112 F. Supp. 224 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
104. PROSSER, ToRTs 522-23 (2d ed. 1955); see Donovan v. Clifford, 225 Mass. 435, 114
N.E. 681 (1917); Swift v.Rounds, 19 R.I. 527, 35 AtL 45 (1896).
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representations or deceit. °5 Alternatively, calling for a bid without
intention of considering it could be a case of misrepresentation. Misrepresentation, although involved in contract actions, is treated as a
tort." 6 And the type of tort that would follow from this action falls
within the exceptions to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Liability does not exist for either interference with contract rights under
the act °7 or interference with economic advantage.108 Furthermore,
since the awarding of contracts is a discretionary function, an aggrieved
plaintiff still may be precluded from recovery under the act.0 9
The second questionable element in Heyer is that since the Court
of Claims has jurisdiction only over contract actions," 0 the nomenclature
of a contract action assumedly was only an accommodating subterfuge
to confer jurisdiction. Thus it is evident that calling this a contract
action probably was necessary if the plaintiff was to receive any relief at
all. Had the suit been in tort, recovery would not have been limited
to bid preparation expenses. Loss of profits also could have been recovered.
Pursuant to the Heyer holding, recovery is predicated upon production of clear and convincing proof. Such stringent requirements obviously will deter the officious suit, but will in no way discourage those
who have been unjustly discriminated against. Proof is the bidder's
greatest obstacle, as is witnessed by the failure of the plaintiff to prove
its allegation when the Heyer case was heard on the merits."'
SPECIFIC RELIEF

An unsuccessful low bidder on a public contract can only benefit if
he is given the specific relief of a chance to perform and make a profit.
However, the task of securing specific relief is not an easy one. Gener105. 62 Stat. 984 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a) (h) (1958). See United States v. Neustadt
366 U.S. 696 (1961); Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d 69 (10th Cit. 1959).
106. PROSSER, TORTS 520-31 (2d ed. 1955).
107. 62 Star. 984 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1958).
See Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 284 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cit. 1960), aff'd without a discussion of
this point, 367 U.S. 886, rehearingdenied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961).
108. Dupree v. United States, 264 F.2d 140 (3d Cir.), aif'd on rehearing, 266 F.2d 373
(3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 823 (1960); Roxfort Holding Co. v. United States,
176 F. Supp. 587 (D.N.J. 1959). But cf. Builders Corp. of America v. United States, 259
F.2d 766 (9th Cit. 1958) (government may be liable for refusal to execute order which
would enable plaintiff's houses to be occupied by army personnel pursuant to agreement).
109. 60 Star. 843 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1958).
See United States v. Waylyn
Corp., 130 F. Supp. 783 (D.P.R. 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 231 F.2d 544 (1st Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 827 (1957).
110. 24 Star. 505 (1887), 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958). But see Ottinger v. United States,
116 Ct. Cl. 282, 88 F. Supp. 881 (1950).
111. Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 63, 177 F. Supp. 251 (1959); accord,
Locke v. United States, 283 F.2d 521 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
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ally, unsuccessful low bidders have been unable to secure review of the
administrative action by certiorari," 2 unable to compel the award by
mandamus, 113 and unable to restrain the award to a higher bidder
through an injunction;" 4 although such relief might be available if
fraud or abuse of discretion were shown." 5 In denying relief, the courts
have emphasized the discretionary nature of making the award."' This
obviously is true where authority exists to reject all bids." 7
Three specific remedies are available to the unsuccessful low bidder.
First, review of the awarding of the contract by certiorari is available in
limited instances. An unsuccessful low bidder has the right to have a.
bid declared illegal only if it appears that it was secured to the detriment
of the public or if other substantial irregularities in its award existed."'
Relief is predicated on the theory that when the bid was received the
lowest bidder had "a vested interest, subject only to being defeated if
itwas found that it was not the lowest responsible bidder .. ..",9
The remedy most frequently sought is a writ of mandamus. It has
been held to lie where the award is arbitrary and in complete disregard
of the law, 2 ' or where the awarding official has no discretion in making
112. State ex rel. Hron Bros. v. City of Port Washington, 265 Wis. 507, 62 N.W.2d 1
(1953); 10 McQUILL-N,MUNIcIPAL CORPORATONS § 29.187 (1950). Contra, Kingston
Bituminous Prods. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 134 N.J.L. 389, 48 A.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1946)
(low bidder has right to have bid accepted); Ianniello v. Town of Harrison, 4 N.J. Misc. 111,
132 Ad. 78 (Sup Ct. 1926) (low bidder prima fade entitled to receive contract).
113. Madison v. Harbor Bd., 76 Md. 395, 25 Ad. 337 (1892); Commonwealth ex rel.
Snyder v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. (1876). But see People ex rel. Haecker Sterling Co. v. City of
Buffalo, 176 N.Y. Supp. 642 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (low bidder has standing for mandamus unless all bids are rejected).
114. Colorado Paving Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (8th Cir. 1897) appeal dismissed, 166
U.S. 719 (1897); Joseph Rugo, Inc. v. Henson, 190 F. Supp. 281 (D. Conn. 1960); Barnes
v. Scranton Poor Dist., 105 Pa. Super. 149, 160 Ad. 241 (1932). Contra, Pittman Constr.
Co. v. Housing Authority, 167 F. Supp. 517 (W.D. La. 1958), ajf'd, 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir.
1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
61, § 40 (Supp. 1962) (unsuccessful bidder may enjoin an
award of a contract).
115. E.g., Leary v. City of Jackson, 247 Mich. 447, 226 N.W. 214 (1929); ArensmeyerWarnack-Zarndt, Inc. v. Wray, 118 Misc. 619, 194 N.Y. Supp. 398 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
116. Van Antwerp v. Board of Comm'rs, 217 Ala. 201, 115 So. 239 (1928); State ex rel.
State Journal Co. v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386, 2 S.W. 846 (1886). But see Schuck v. School
Dist., 296 Pa. 408, 146 Ad. 24 (1929) (contract to be awarded, ifat all, to the lowest bidder).
117. E.g., United States Wood Preserving Co. v. Sundmaker, 186 Fed. 678 (6th Cir. 1911);
Charles L. Harney, Inc. v. Durkee, 107 Cal. App. 2d 570, 237 P.2d 561 (1951).
118. Chick's Constr. Co. v. Wachusett Regional High School Dist., 343 Mass. 38, 175
N.X.2d 502 (1961). Contra, Hron Bros. v. City of Port Washington, 265 Wis. 507, 62
N.W.2d 1 (1953).
119. Edward J. Rose, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 39 N.J. Super. 565, 568, 121 A.2d 549, 551
(Super. Ct. 1956); see Sellitto v. Cedar Grove Twp., 133 NJ.L. 41, 42, 42 A.2d 383, 385
(Sup. Cr. 1945). ("Prosecutor's status as the lowest bidder, is not one of grace; it is one of
right.")
120. Brown v. City of Phoenix, 77 Ariz. 368, 272 P.2d 358 (1954); Delta Democrat Publishing Co. v. Board of Pub. Contracts, 224 Miss. 848, 81 So. 2d 715 (1955); Luboil Heat
& Power Corp. v. Pleydell, 172 Misc. 562, 34 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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the award.'' It thus has been held to be the proper remedy to compel
a contracting officer to exercise his discretion. But it will not be used
to control his ultimate decision as to who is the lowest responsible
bidder. " Issuance of the writ has been denied where other remedies
exist. 2 ' Mandamus has been held to be the proper remedy when statutes
require a potential
bidder to prequalify as to his capabilities and re2

sponsibility."

Injunction is a third remedy. In fact, a court is more likely to
enjoin the award of a contract than compel the awarding authority to
enter into a contract with the low bidder. Some courts have interpreted
low bidder statutes as authorizing an injunction to prevent an award
to one other than the low bidder.'2 5 Obtaining performance at the lowest cost is the overriding consideration in most contract awards. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to consider the low bidder to be prima
facie entitled to the award. He should be able to enjoin further progress
until a determination of the lowest bid is made, price and other factors
considered.
OTHER RELIEF

Relief may be available to a bidders on federal contracts through appeals to the Comptroller General. Federal authorities are required to
make an award to the lowest responsible bidder and, in the absence of a
determination as to lack of responsibility, no authority exists to support
an award to a higher bidder.'2 6 The Comptroller General will make a
determination as to the propriety of the rejection of a contractor's bid."2
The small business concern has available still another remedy in
certain instances. The federal government has promulgated the policy
121. Cf. Magnotta v. Gerlach, 275 App. Div. 854, 89 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1949) (property to
be sold to the highest bidder).
122. Dictaphone Corp. v. O'Leary, 287 N.Y. 491, 41 N.E.2d 68 (1942).
123. People ex rel. Lunney v. Campbell, 72 N.Y. 497 (1878) (damages); State ex rel.
Al Monzo Constr. Co. v. Board of Control, 172 Ohio St. 370, 176 N.E.2d 427 (1961) (mandamus will not lie where injunction or appeal is available); State ex rel. Cotleur v. Board
of Educ., 171 Ohio St. 335, 170 N.E.2d 845 (1960) (same); State ex rel. DeRackin v. Allen,
8 Wash. 168, 35 Pac. 609 (1894) (appeal). But see Times Publishing Co. v. City of Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 37 Pac. 695 (1894).
124. State ex rel. Fischer Constr. Co. v. Linzell, 101 Ohio App. 219, 137 N.E.2d 427
(1955).
125. State ex rel. Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. Studebaker, 175 Ohio St. 222, 193 N.E.2d 84
(1963) (per curiam). See Housing Authority v. Pittman Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th
Cir. 1959); Murdock Contracting Co. v. Borough of Verona, 47 N.J. Super. 102, 135 A.2d
352 (Super. Ct. 1957); Sellitto v. Cedar Grove Township, 133 N.J.L. 41, 42 A.2d 383 (Sup.
Ct. 1945). Contra, Malan Constr. Co. v. Board of County Rd. Comm'rs, 187 F. Supp. 937
(E.D. Mich. 1960).
126. 37 DEcs. COMP. GEN. 51 (1957), aff'd on reconsideration, 37 DECS. CoMP. GEN.
550 (1958).
127. See 32 DEcs. COMP. GEN. 251 (1952); 16 DECS. COMP. GEN. 497 (1936).
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of placing a fair proportion of its contracts with small business concerns."
Under the Small Business Act, a prospective government contractor can apply for a "certificate of competency."' 9 Such a certificate
means that the firm is able to meet the contract requirements. After
the Small Business Administration concludes its investigation, it will
issue the certificate if it finds that the applicant possesses the requisite
capacity to successfully perform the contract. Such a determination is
binding on the contracting officer. 3 ' The certificate, however, is valid
only for the specific contract involved.' 3 ' Similar provisions under the
Small Defense Plants Act,' 32 although seemingly all inclusive, have been
held conclusive only insofar as the finding of a plant's capacity and
credit. "It does not presume to certify that the plant will perform only
that it can."'
Furthermore, the language of the statute only "authorizes" an award; prior poor performance will justify a rejection of the
bid despite the certificate. The Small Business Act, although incorporating the same language, does appear to carry a mandate that the con34
tract shall be awarded to one who has the certificate of competency.
Moreover, such a certificate has been interpreted as conclusive of ability
to perform, experience, skill, "know how," and technical knowledge. 33
It is not valid, however, as to moral character, which probably would
be the sole basis of rejection left to the contracting officer."' 6
At the state level, under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act,
for example, an unsuccessful low bidder can appeal a rejection of its
bid to the Court of Common Pleas. 1 The court, however, is somewhat restricted as to what action it can take. It can only reverse, affirm, modify, or vacate if the order is found to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. 3 The more desirable specific remedies mentioned
128. See 75 Star. 439, 23 U.S.C. § 304 (1958) (interstate highway system); 75 Stat.
439, 22 U.S.C. § 2352 (Supp. I1, 1961) (foreign aid). See also 13 DECs. COMP. GEN.
315 (1934).
129. 72 Stat. 389, 15 U.S.C. § 637(b) (7) (1958). See 72 Stat. 389, 15 U.S.C. §§ 637
(a)(1)-(2), (d)(1) (1958).
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. 64 Star. 821 (1950) 50 U.S.C. § 2163a(f) (1) (Supp. 1952).
133. United States v. Thompson, 168 F. Supp. 281, 289 (N.D. W. Va. 1958), afI'd per
ctram, 268 F.2d 426 (4th Cit. 1959). See 37 DEcs. CoM. GE . 676 (1957).
134. 72 Stat. 395, 15 U.S.C. § 644 (1958).
135. 38 DEcs. CoMP. GEN. 864 (1959). A certificate can be rescinded if it is found that the
applicant is not a small business. 34 DEcs. CoMP. GEN. 115 (1954); cf. 35 DEcs. COMP.
GEM. 233 (1955).

136. Ibid.
137. OHIo REV. CODE § 2505.01; State ex rel. Al Monzo Constr. Co. v. Board of Control,
172 Ohio St. 370, 176 N.E.2d 427 (1961); cf. Columbus Blank Book Co. v. Maloon, 116
Ohio App. 363, 188 N.E.2d 431 (1963).
138. See OHIo REv. CODE § 2506.04.
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above are unavailable. Where there is a dispute as to the lowest bidder,
the rejection of all bids and readvertising appears to be a substitute but
an undesirable alternative. For the bidding on the second letting will
tend to gravitate around the apparent low bid on the first letting. Accordingly, many of the advantages of competitive bidding will be lost.
The apparent low bidder should not be rejected until after there has
been a full and complete investigation of his qualifications and a
determination that he lacks the equipment or facilities for the particular
contract. The facts must justify a reasonable belief that he cannot perform.
CONCLUSION

An unsuccessful low bidder's lack of standing to sue diminishes the
efficacy of the competitive bidding statutes. Unreviewable administrative discretion necessarily results in wasteful government spending. Being denied standing, the contractor has been forced to sue in tort. This
remedy, however, becomes futile whenever the contractor's rights cease
to coincide with those of the public. The result of such a policy is to
require the government to accept the lowest responsible bid or respond
in damages. While this does not tend to seriously handicap the discretionary area of contracting officials, the probability of an increased
number of civil suits is apparent. This certainly would involve damaging results on the local level as in the contracts of small villages. Furthermore, such a recourse fails to rectify the injury done to the public
by the wrongful action. A more workable and constructive solution
would be to give the unsuccessful low bidder standing to contest the
award and make available to him such specific relief as may be proper.
Review should be allowed to determine whether the contracting officer
has acted within the perimeter of his discretionary powers. Reviewable
cases should be limited to situations where the apparent low bidder has
not been awarded the contract. Although various remedies are now
available, there is an open question as to what relief, if any, will be
given in a particular case. As a practical matter, judicial reluctance to
interfere seemingly is the greatest obstacle confronting the disappointed
low bidder.
PAUL A. MANCINO

